This paper presents an alternative implementation of …rm-level collective wage bargaining, where bargaining proceeds as a …nite sequence of sessions between a …rm and a union of variable size. We investigate the impact of such a 'gradual'union on the wage-employment contract in an economy with concave production. In a static framework, the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the e¢ cient bargaining outcome. In a dynamic framework with search frictions, we demonstrate that gradual collective wage bargaining coincides with all-or-nothing bargaining when bargaining takes place in …ctitious time before production.
Introduction
The general assumption in canonical collective bargaining models is that all employed union members return to the external labor market permanently when negotiations fail. 1 In many real-world labor markets characterized by search frictions, such immediate termination may not be an accurate assumption because it entails, e.g., search costs of …nding a new job, search costs of replacing the workforce and opportunity costs of forgone production. Therefore, it is unlikely that neither the union seriously contemplates leaving the …rm permanently, nor the …rm credibly considers dismissing its entire workforce. 2 This paper presents an alternative implementation of decentralized collective wage bargaining, replacing the usual 'all-or-nothing'union by our proposed 'gradual'union. Essentially, in a discrete labor setting, the latter implies that the union bargains on behalf of N workers and if negotiations break down, the marginal worker leaves the …rm and the union rebargains
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y Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute and IZA. z Amsterdam University College and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 1 For the ungoing relevance of union wage bargaining, especially for European countries, we refer to Booth (2014) . 2 Bauer and Lingens (2013) provide a rare example of Ronald Reagan's dismissal of air tra…c controllers in 1981, arguably a political rather than an economic act. on behalf of the remaining N 1 workers, and so forth. In terms of interpretation, any time before production, the …rm may …re an employee, or alternatively, an employee might grow frustrated and exit the …rm after which bargaining resumes. Such a collective bargaining environment is particularly relevant in an 'at-will …rm'where wage o¤ers are unenforceable and renegotiations are frequent. We refer to Hogan (2001) for a rationalization of the presence of a union in an incomplete contracting environment.
We investigate the impact of a gradual union on the equilibrium wage-employment contract in both a static and dynamic framework of …rm-level collective wage bargaining in an economy with concave production. In a static framework, the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium under e¢ cient bargaining (EB), which assumes an all-or-nothing union (McDonald and Solow, 1981) . In a dynamic framework where the …rm cannot instantaneously replace workers after a breakdown of the wage bargaining, …rm-level employment is no longer e¢ cient. We demonstrate that gradual collective wage bargaining still coincides with all-ornothing bargaining when bargaining takes place in …ctitious time before production.
Our article relates to two strands of literature. First, our static analysis reexamines the work of Stole and Zwiebel (SZ) (1996a, 1996b) on intra-…rm individual bargaining under non-binding contracts, based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the …rm and its employees to wages and employment. The employment-at-will assumption, together with employee hold-up power, yields ine¢ ciencies in hiring decisions. In equilibrium, the SZ …rm overhires relative to the neoclassical (NC) …rm to such an extent that bargained wages are driven down to the reservation wage. Our implementation of gradual collective wage bargaining allows to investigate how equilibrium wages and pro…ts of SZ's at-will …rm alter when bargaining takes place collectively rather than individually. Similar to all-or-nothing collective wage bargaining, gradual collective wage bargaining removes the wage externality by hindering …rms from instantaneous renegotiations with individual workers. Table 1 summarizes various characteristics of the di¤erent bargaining arrangements that are compared in our static analysis. and all-or-nothing bargaining when bargaining takes place in …ctitious time before production starts. The fact that also under gradual bargaining all employees may exit o¤ the equilibrium path in the current period explains this equivalence result. We conclude that ine¢ ciencies in hiring decisions that arise in an economy characterized by search frictions and collective wage bargaining are not driven by the particular implementation of …rm-level all-or-nothing collective bargaining.
The plan of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the gradual union in a static SZ framework. Section 3 extends the analysis to a dynamic large-…rm search and bargaining environment. Section 4 concludes.
Gradual collective wage bargaining without search frictions
In Section 2.1, we present our gradual collective wage bargaining model in a static SZ framework with discrete labor and without externalities arising from job search. In Section 2.2, we derive the equilibrium wage-employment contract and demonstrate its equivalence with the equilibrium wage-employment contract under e¢ cient bargaining.
Bargaining environment
Consider a …xed-size union of N 2 N members. A subset of N union members (the employees) work in the …rm. We assume that the union is su¢ ciently large to cover labor demand (N N ). We endogenize the choice of N later on. We denote w(N ) the employee's wage in a …rm with N employees. The reservation wage is w. The …rm utilizes a single-asset, strictly increasing and strictly concave production function F (N ) : N ! R + . We assume that F (j) jw for j 2 f1; : : : ; N g. Furthermore, F (0) = 0. Denote the …rst-di¤erence operator, e.g.
Both the …rm and workers are risk-neutral.
In the at-will …rm, wage o¤ers are unenforceable. Any time before production starts, the …rm may …re an employee, or alternatively, an employee may quit the …rm. Employees are irreplaceable. An employee who returns to the external labor market can never re-enter the …rm and stays a union member earning the reservation wage.
Union preferences are represented by a utilitarian objective function. The union's payo¤ when there are N employees equals:
The union's payo¤ when there are N 1 employees equals:
Hence, the gradual union's net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals:
The …rm's net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals:
Following the collective bargaining literature, we assume that conventional generalized Nash bargaining is the appropriate solution concept. The bargaining scope is negotiation over wages alone. The …rm chooses the employment level that maximizes pro…ts. The bargained wage follows from maximizing the Nash product :
where 2 [0; 1] denotes the workers'bargaining power.
For the sake of expositional clarity, we present an extensive-form bargaining game which unique subgame perfect equilibrium corresponds with the equilibrium wage-employment contract that follows from our static model. Bargaining proceeds as a …nite sequence of pairwise bargaining sessions over wages between the union and the …rm. In Figure 1 , each bargaining session is depicted by a box, representing the number of employees on which behalf the union is negotiating with the …rm. In the …rst bargaining session, the union represents N employees. In each bargaining session, either the union and the …rm reach an agreement (A), or negotiations break down (B). Whenever an agreement is reached, the game ends. Whenever a bargaining session ends in a breakdown, one randomly chosen employee exits the game forever, after which bargaining instantaneously starts again between the …rm and the union representing the remaining employees. At most N bargaining sessions can occur before the game terminates in which case all employees have dropped out following failed bargaining sessions.
Within each bargaining session, the union and the …rm play a variant of the Rubinstein (1982) alternating-o¤ers game where the …rm and the union alternate wage o¤ers. If an o¤er is accepted, production occurs and the wage is paid. If an o¤er is rejected by the …rm (union), the bargain is either terminated by a speci…c separation shock that hits at a rate f ( u ) or proceeds to the next round, allowing the …rm (union) to make a countero¤er.
The game continues until the bargaining parties are separated or reach an agreement, which will occur instantaneously in equilibrium. Binmore et al. (1986) show that the generalized Nash bargaining solution emerges for the limit outcome where the time between o¤er and countero¤er approaches zero. 3 
Equivalence with e¢ cient bargaining
Using the sharing rule that follows from maximizing Eq. (5), it holds that:
(j) (j 1) = 1 (jw(j) (j 1)w(j 1) w) for all j = 1; : : : ; N
Since (j) = F (j) jw(j) and (j 1) = F (j 1) (j 1)w(j 1), it follows that:
Summing up Eq. (7) for j = 1; : : : ; N , we obtain:
Using Eq. (8), the …rm's pro…t equals:
Hence, the pro…t-maximizing …rm chooses the employment level that coincides with the optimal employment level of the NC …rm that writes binding contracts with its workers at the reservation wage. It is well known that the optimal level of employment under e¢ cient bargaining with risk-neutral agents also coincides with the latter. As such, we obtain a powerful e¢ ciency argument for gradual collective bargaining. Table 2 compares the equilibrium wage-employment contract in our setting with those of the NC …rm, the EB …rm and the SZ …rm.
4 Table 2 : Comparison of equilibrium wage-employment contracts
The bargaining power of the union equals f u+ f . 4 The rankings in Table 2 assume that 2 (0; 1) in our setting, the EB setting and the SZ setting.
Our equivalence result with EB con…rms that in a static SZ environment, collective wage bargaining removes the wage externality by hindering …rms from instantaneous renegotiations with its individual workers. As Stole and Zwiebel (1996b, Sec. III.B.) demonstrate, a union has the e¤ect of linearizing the production function since the …rm is now dealing with a single entity whose marginal product is identical to its total product. As a result, the bargained wage is no longer a function of employment and thus, the …rm has no strategic overhiring incentive anymore. It is important that the e¢ ciency argument for collective bargaining holds irrespective of whether one considers a gradual union (as we do) or an all-or-nothing union (as in Stole and Zwiebel, 1996b ).
In the next section we extend the analysis to a dynamic environment with search frictions.
Gradual collective wage bargaining with search frictions
In Section 3.1, we introduce the dynamic large-…rm search and bargaining environment of BL, following the work of Smith (1999) and Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) . In Section 3.2, we derive the wage setting curve under gradual collective wage bargaining and show that the equilibrium under gradual collective wage bargaining coincides with the equilibrium under all-or-nothing collective bargaining. In Section 3.3, we discuss the ine¢ cient equilibrium allocation that emerges in our economy.
Environment
Time proceeds as a in…nite sequence of discrete periods, where the length of a time interval is denoted by . Consider a continuum of workers and a large, countable number of …rms m. The population of workers, who each supply one unit of labor inelastically, is …xed and normalized to one. Each …rm i opens a continuum of vacancies V i which involve ‡ow costs c per vacancy and employs a continuum of workers N i . All agents are risk-neutral, in…nitely lived and discount future income at rate r. All …rms use an identical production technology F (N i ) with the same properties as in our static model. The aggregate number of matches between workers and …rms is given by M (U; V ) = U V 1 , where > 0, 2 (0; 1), V is the economy-wide number of vacancies and U is the pool of unemployed workers. Let labor market tightness be denoted by = V =U , the vacancy …lling rate by m ( ) = M=V = and the job …nding rate by p ( ) = m ( ). At the end of each period, an exogenous proportion s of …lled jobs are destroyed.
Equilibrium wage-employment contract
The timing of events is as follows. First, wages are bargained. Then, …rms choose the number of vacancies, given the bargained wage. As the …rm's problem is stationary, it can be solved recursively. In what follows, we do not explicitly consider the vacancy choice of the …rm but refer to BL for the derivation of the job creation curve, which we here repeat for further reference:
We now turn to the derivation of the wage-setting curve for our gradual collective wage bargaining setting.
Wage determination
We assume that we are in a steady state in which the …rm always returns to the target employment level N i in the next period, irrespective of what happens in the current period. This implies that the size of the union is constant at N i .
The utility of an employed worker in a …rm with employment N i is:
where W b denotes the outside option of the worker.
The utility of an employed worker in a …rm with employment N i " is:
Next, we specify the union objective. With N i workers, the payo¤ of the union is:
If " workers leave the …rm, the payo¤ of the union is:
Thus:
Turning to the …rm side, the payo¤ (pro…t) of the …rm with N i workers is:
Since the di¤erence equation for …rm-level employment equals:
it holds that:
Substituting Eq. (18) in Eq. (16) yields:
If " workers leave the …rm, the payo¤ of the …rm is:
The surplus sharing rule following Nash bargaining in our gradual union setting implies:
Substituting Eqs. (15) and (21) in Eq. (22), dividing both sides by " and taking the limit as " ! 0 yields:
Notice that on both sides, the wage schedule w(N i ) enters only via the derivative of the total wage bill. Isolating this derivative on the left-hand side yields:
Integrating Eq. (24) and dividing both sides by N i yields the wage-setting curve in our gradual collective wage bargaining setting:
Equivalence with wage setting under all-or-nothing collective wage bargaining
In order to show the equivalence with wage setting under all-or-nothing collective wage bargaining of BL, we derive the steady-state wage. In steady state N i = N i . Using Eq. (11) to solve for W e (N i ) W b yields:
Substituting Eq. (26) in Eq. (25), multiplying both sides by (1 + r ) and subtracting rW b from both sides gives:
, we obtain:
Dividing both sides of Eq. (28) by (1 + r ) and de…ning
Eq. (29) coincides with the wage-setting curve (WS) in BL (p. 1075). In the latter, This equivalence between wage setting under gradual collective bargaining and all-or-nothing collective bargaining arises because also under gradual bargaining all employees may exit o¤ the equilibrium path in the current period. Hence, breaking the bargaining process down in gradual steps does not a¤ect the wage outcome. It is important to note that our equivalence result is obtained when bargaining occurs in …ctitious time before production starts.
As BL show, Eqs. (10) and (29) determine employment and wages at the …rm level. Employment satis…es:
Note that in the absence of search frictions (c = 0), employment is e¢ cient as the marginal production value of a worker equals the worker's outside option, as long as the environment implies ! 0. This observation con…rms our static equivalence result of gradual collective wage bargaining and e¢ cient bargaining of McDonald and Solow (1981) (see Section 2.2).
Ine¢ cient equilibrium allocation
We discuss the ine¢ cient equilibrium allocation that arises in our search and collective wage bargaining economy in the case of an exogenous number of …rms. Given the equivalent wage setting under all-or-nothing or gradual collective bargaining, this allocation coincides with the equilibrium allocation of BL who derive that …rm-level employment and labor market tightness are ine¢ ciently low. We highlight the role of the curvature of the production function and the union's bargaining power in a¤ecting the …rm's optimal employment decision.
When workers cannot be replaced instantaneously, the …rm has an incentive to hire strategically, which can be seen from di¤erentiating Eq. (29):
This wage externality allows the …rm to lower the wage by hiring additional workers. In isolation, overemployment would result. However, not only the incentive for overhiring emerges but bargained wages also increase. This countervailing wage rise e¤ect arises for two reasons. First, workers'ability to hold up production increases …rms'costs of rejecting a wage o¤er. Second, overhiring increases workers'job …nding probability and thereby decreases the workers'costs of rejecting a wage o¤er.
BL demonstrate that the countervailing wage rise e¤ect dominates the strategic vacancy posting e¤ect by comparing the policy function, which implicitly relates …rm-level employment N i to labor market tightness , in their all-or-or-nothing collective bargaining setting to the policy function of a utilitarian planner. In a symmetric stationary equilibrium where …rm-level and aggregate employment are constant, these policy functions take the following form (see Eqs. (23) and (22) in BL):
with
. In Eq. (32), the Hosios condition is imposed to ensure that the crowding externality of …rms'vacancy choice is internalized.
An increase in the curvature of the production function (via
) or a larger bargaining power of the union (via b ) increases
in Eq. (31). Hence, ine¢ ciently low equilibrium …rm-level employment negatively depends on both the curvature and the union bargaining power parameters (see Eq (32)).
Conclusion
To acknowledge the prevalence of collective bargaining in contemporary labor markets characterized by search frictions, this paper presents an alternative implementation of …rm-level collective wage bargaining. In a sequence of bargaining sessions, the gradual union bargains on behalf of its workers and if negotiations break down, a marginal employee leaves the …rm and the union rebargains on behalf of the remaining workers. We investigate the impact of gradual collective bargaining on the equilibrium wage-employment contract in an economy with concave production.
In the static framework of Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) , the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the static e¢ cient bargaining outcome of McDonald and Solow (1981) . The driving force behind this equivalence result is that collective wage bargaining removes the wage externality by preventing …rms from renegotiating instantaneously with its individual workers. A union has the e¤ect of linearizing the production function. The bargained wage is no longer a function of employment and the …rm has no strategic overhiring incentive anymore. The e¢ ciency argument for collective bargaining holds irrespective of whether one considers a gradual union or an all-or-nothing union.
In the dynamic framework with search frictions of Bauer and Lingens (2013), we demonstrate that wage setting under gradual collective bargaining and all-or-nothing collective bargaining again coincide when bargaining takes place in …ctitious time before production starts. In case the …rm cannot immediately replace its workforce and abstracting from …rm entry, it has been shown that the wage rise e¤ect typical of unionized bargaining dominates the strategic overhiring e¤ect. We conclude that the resulting ine¢ cient equilibrium allocation in a search and collective wage bargaining economy is not driven by the particular implementation of …rm-level all-or-nothing collective bargaining.
